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In this paper I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s
fragmentalism—that can be combined with aweakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which
I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism
divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejec-
tion of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich our understanding of concretism, by
proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with
transworld identity.
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1 Introduction
Fragmentalism is a non-standard version of A-theory originally presented by Kit Fine (2005).
In the last few years different interpretations and developments of the view have been pro-
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posed.1 In this paper, I’m going to explore and discuss an extension of fragmentalism to
modality, which I will call Modal Fragmentalism (section 3). In particular, I will argue that
Modal Fragmentalism is a version of concretism (the view that possible worlds are concrete
entities) which can be combined with a weakening of the idea that everything there is is ac-
tual. To clearly characterise the view, (i) I will discuss some crucial differences between Lewis’s
concretism andModal Fragmentalism (sections 4, 5), and (ii) I will study how the latter reacts
to the simplest quantified modal logic (section 6).
Before introducing the view, I would like to stress that in this paper I’m not going to
argue for Modal Fragmentalism. I will simply try to prove that it is a coherent view which
has been so far overlooked. Regardless of the motivations to adopt Modal Fragmentalism,
there are two reasons why studying it is worth the effort. Firstly, proving that it is a coherent
view can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide (presented in section
2), by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to
an outright rejection of the actualist idea that everything which exists is actual. Secondly, but
not less importantly, it can enrich our understanding of concretism. As we will see in detail,
the Lewisian (1986) version of concretismmaintains that, unless objects are world-bound, the
idea that they have properties in an absolute manner (i.e. not relative to a world) and the idea
that reality does not contain genuine contradictions cannot be held together. As I will argue,
Modal Fragmentalism can keep the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner
1See for instance Lipman (2015, 2018), Loss (2017), Hofweber and Lange (2017), Simon (2018), and Iaquinto
(2019).
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while accepting that the same object can be located inmore than one possible world. In doing
so, it does not force us to accept the idea that reality contains contradictory facts like—say—
the fact thatAlice is and is not a philosopher. Let us then start by presenting the actualism vs.
possibilism debate and its connections with the simplest quantified modal logic.
2 Actualism, possibilism, and the simplest quantified modal logic
Actualism—in theway Iwill use the term in this paper—is the thesis that everything there is is
actual.2 AsLinsky andZalta (1994) point out, the actualist view is constituted by twodifferent
theses. According to the first thesis (Thesis I), the quantifier ‘there is’ should be understood as
existentially loaded. It follows that within an actualist framework there is no reason to think
of ‘there is’ as distinct from ‘there exists’. In essence, the actualist picture is anti-Meinongian,
basically embracingQuine’s (1948) reading of quantifiers. Thus, actualism is often formulated
as the view that everything which exists is actual. According to the second thesis (Thesis II),
there are no non-actual objects (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 436). Possibilism, on the contrary,
is the view that there are things that are non-actual.3 In other words, it requires an explicit
rejection of Thesis II. As wewill see in the next few lines, there are versions of possibilism that
reject also Thesis I, while other versions accept it.
Notoriously, a good way to frame the differences between actualism and possibilism and
to appreciate their metaphysical import is to study how they relate to the simplest quantified
2See, inter alia, Linsky and Zalta (1994: 436), Menzel (1990: 355), Adams (1974: 202), Plantinga (1976: 257).
3See for instance Menzel (2008) and Lycan (2002).
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modal logic (SQML).4 Following Linsky and Zalta (1994), I will treat SQML as the combina-
tion of the simplest propositional modal logic Kwith classical first-order predicate logic, with
the addition of the Barcan (1946) formula:
(BF) ♦∃xϕ→ ∃x♦ϕ
Many actualists—who I’m going to label as standard actualists—reject SQML. Themain
reason of this rejection is that SQML validates formulae that are incompatible with some ac-
tualist assumptions (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 436-438; see alsoWilliamson 1998: 258). Consider
for instance BF. From the premise that it is (metaphysically) possible that I have a sister, it fol-
lows by BF that there is an object that possibly is my sister. This is puzzling: I have no sister,
so what is the entity that satisfies the property of possibly being my sister? “On the plausible
assumption that one’s parentage is essential to one” (Williamson 1998: 258),5 it is clear that
no actual object can bear this property. This is evidence—standard actualists conclude—that
BF is false (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 436-437; Williamson 1998: 258). Hence, whoever wants
to adopt a possible world semantics within an actualist framework should give up SQML
in favour of a semantics in which BF is invalid (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 437). The possibilist
can easily avoid this metaphysical conundrum. As underlined by Linsky and Zalta, she might
drop the assumption that ‘there is’ is existentially loaded (that is, she might reject Thesis I),
4Throughout this paper, I will assume nomore than aminimal acquaintance with modal logic, setting aside
all the unnecessary technicalities. For the formal details, the reader can refer to Linsky and Zalta (1994: 433-435).
5For a defence of origin essentialism see Kripke (1980), Salmon (1981), and Forbes (1985).
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by introducing in her language an existence predicate such that it cannot be defined by using
the quantifier ‘there is’. This would allow her to say that by BF all that follows is that there is
an object that possibly is my sister. In contrast to the actualist, nothing compels her to claim
that this object also exists (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 435, 437).
Further worries arise in analysing the theorem:
(NE) ∀x∃y y = x
Assuming that the quantifier ‘there is’ is existentially loaded, the formula says that for any ob-
ject x, x necessarily exists: a striking conclusion, for it seems plausible that there are objects
that exist contingently (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 437-438). Again, when it comes to offer a read-
ing consistent with SQML, the possibilist seems to be in a better position than the actualist.
Taking ‘there is’ to be existentially unloaded, shemight readNE as simply saying that for allx,
necessarily there is x. There is no reason why she should maintain that everything necessarily
exists (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 435, 437). Thus, within the possibilist framework NE proves to
be innocuous.
Here is another theorem of SQML:6
(BC) ∀xϕ→ ∀xϕ
NE is directly entailed by BC (Linsky and Zalta 1994: 437), so that in evaluating the latter the
actualist is bound to face—once again—theproblems just described inpresenting the former.7
6BC (Barcan’s Corverse) is the converse of this formula: ∀xϕ→∀xϕ, which is equivalent to BF.
7See also Williamson (1998: 258).
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The possibilist—once again—has the resources to preserve BC, by assuming that objects can
bear properties also in worlds in which they do not satisfy the existence predicate. Thus, BC
will simply state that, if necessarily every object satisfies a given property, then every object
necessarily satisfies that property (p. 435). In the light of the possibilist reading, ‘every object’
does not refer to everything which exists, but simply to everything there is.
Note that the possibilist has the resources to evaluate BF, NE, and BC as true even if—in
accordance with one of the core ideas of actualism—she interprets ‘there is’ as existentially
loaded (so endorsing Thesis I). Indeed, she might enrich the inventory of the world with pos-
sible objects, in addition to the actual ones (p. 435). In the light of the resulting view, which
we can call ontic possibilism, it follows by BF that there is a possible (non-actual) object bear-
ing the property of being my sister. In evaluating NE, the possibilist will opt for the reading
according to which every object necessarily exists, instead of the reading according to which
every object is necessarily actual. Thus, the fact that BC entails NE does not raise any concern.
And BC can be read as allowing things to bear properties in possible worlds in which they are
non-actual objects (p. 436).
While standard actualists usually reject SQML, attributing to it the unpalatable conse-
quences just described, other philosophers—who I will call non-standard actualists—try to
reconcile it with actualism. Roughly speaking, the move at the root of non-standard actual-
ism is to enrich the ontologywith actually existing entities able to play the same role played by
non-actual entities in the possibilist interpretation of modal semantics. In particular, Linsky
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and Zalta (1994, 1996) andWilliamson (1998, 2000b, 2013) reject the idea that concrete things
are essentially concrete, so allowing for contingently nonconcrete entities. In Linsky and Zalta
(1994: 432)’s words:
The abstract/concrete distinction is mistakenly seen as an absolute difference in the nature of
objects. Thus, abstract objects are thought to be essentially abstract, and concreteness is thought
to be part of the nature of concrete objects, something they couldn’t fail to have (whenever they
exist). Wequestion these ideas bymotivating and introducingwhatmight be called ‘contingently
nonconcrete objects’. Contingently nonconcrete objects exist and are actual, and they shall re-
place ‘possibilia’.
By inflating their ontology with contingently nonconcrete entities, non-standard actualists
wouldhave the resources to embrace the truth-conditionsofmodal formulaeofferedbySQML
without appealing to non-actual entities.
Enriching the actualist ontology with entities that are by some means able to replace pos-
sibilia seems to be the only way to reconcile actualism and SQML. It may be that introducing
contingently nonconcrete entities is not the only viable option. One might try to achieve a
similar result by replacing possibilia with Plantinga (1974)’s abstract individualities (or non-
instantiated haecceities).8 At any rate, an outright rejection of the idea that there are non-
actual objects seems to require the inflation of the actualist inventory of the world, as far as
8Even though Plantinga (1976: 156-157) prefers a variable domain semantics that invalidates BF.
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one is interested in keeping SQML. It seems also clear that allowing for possibilia is tanta-
mount to rejecting actualism, at least as the latter has been so far described. That said, I will
now argue that Modal Fragmentalism is able to partially vindicate the idea that everything
there is is actual, since, as I repeat, it incorporates a weakening of actualism. Let us then anal-
yse the view starting with a discussion of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism.
3 Fragmentalism and modality
Standard tense realism is the view that irreducibly tensed facts, such as the fact that Tim is
sitting, constitute a coherent reality in an absolute sense. Turning to a slightly more precise
framework, I will follow Fine (2005: 270-272, 2006: 399-400) in treating standard tense real-
ism as the conjunction of the following three theses:
Realism Reality is constituted (at least, in part) by tensed facts.
Absolutism The constitution of reality is an absolute matter, i.e. not relative to a time or other
form of temporal standpoint.
Coherence Reality is not contradictory; it is not constitutedby factswith incompatible content.
For reasons that here we can safely ignore, standard tense realism is incompatible with the
following claim:
Neutrality No time is privileged; the facts that constitute reality are not oriented towards one
time as opposed to another.9
9As Fine (2005: 272, 2006: 400) argues, the conjunction of standard tense realism and Neutrality leads to a
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Fragmentalism is the non-standard version of tense realism that embraces both Absolutism
andNeutralitywhile rejectingCoherence (Fine 2005: 280). Indescribing time, the fragmental-
ist gives up the assumption that reality is “of a piece”. Namely, she maintains that it is divided
up intomaximally coherent collections of tensed facts, called fragments.10 All themoments of
time are then reframed as fragments (Fine 2005: 308-310). While each fragment is taken to be
internally coherent, thewhole of reality is not. Now, there are differentways to articulate such
a view.11 In what follows, I will treat obtainment and constitution as two equally fundamen-
tal notions, while upholding Fine’s idea that fragments are maximally coherent collections of
tensed facts.12 Within a standard framework, the two notions are intimately connected. In
particular, the standard tense realist is willing to subscribe to the following principle:
(P) A tensed fact f obtains if and only if f constitutes reality.
In my view, the fragmentalist rejects (P). She accepts that a tensed fact obtains only if it con-
version of McTaggart’s (1908) Paradox.
10Properly speaking, the fragmentalist is not bound to adopt an ontology of facts. The “fact-talk” I’m endors-
ing here can easily be replaced by a language that exploits Fine’s ‘in reality’ sentential operator; see Fine (2005:
268).
11Interesting proposals can be found in Lipman (2015), who exploits a primitive notion of coherence, and
in Loss (2017), who interprets fragmentalism as a form of subvaluationism. For an intriguing taxonomy of the
fragmentalist approaches, based on “how much incompatibility the fragmentalist thinks we can live with, [. . . ]
how “jagged” one’s fragmentalism is”, see Simon (2018).
12This approach has been firstly presented in Iaquinto (2019) and then further developed in Torrengo and
Iaquinto (2019).
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stitutes reality. Still, if a tensed fact constitutes reality, it is not trivial at all that the fact also
obtains. This idea can be easily conjoined with both the assumption that tensed facts consti-
tute reality in an absolutemanner (viz., with the adoption ofAbsolutism) and the assumption
that reality is incoherent (viz., with the rejection of Coherence): reality is constituted, in an
absolute manner, by irreducibly incompatible facts, even though such facts can never obtain
within the same fragment.13 To put it another way, while for the standard tense realist obtain-
ment in the present is obtainment simpliciter, for the fragmentalist there is no obtainment
simpliciter, but only within a fragment; yet, constitution is understood as absolute.
The fragmentalist treats the notion of constitution as quite similar to the generic notion
that the standard tense realist has inmindwhen thinkingof constitution, in that shemaintains
thatwhen a tensed fact constitutes reality, the fact is real in an absolutemanner. If the fact that
Tim is sitting constitutes reality, then the fact that Tim is sitting is real absolutely speaking.
The fragmentalist notion of obtainment, on the contrary, sounds quite exotic. So now the
crucial question is: what exactly is it for a tensed fact to obtain within a fragment, as opposed
to simply constitute reality?14 The thesis that a tensed fact obtains only within a fragment can
be linked with the idea that when a fact obtains, the fact exists relative to a given fragment.15
If the fact thatTim is sitting obtains within a fragment, then the fact thatTim is sitting exists
13Cf. Fine (2005: 281).
14I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to answer this question.
15The close connection between obtainment and existence is attested in the literature. AsMulligan and Cor-
reia (2017) put it: “If a state of affairs obtains, then an obtaining state of affairs exists, a fact exists”.
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relative to that fragment. Notice that this latter claim should not be confused with the truism
that if the fact obtains within the fragment, then it is part of (or belongs to) the fragment.
The idea is that its very existence is limited to that fragment. This means that there can be
fragments relative to which the fact literally lacks existence. There are then two principles the
fragmentalist can adopt to articulate her conception of constitution and obtainment:
Constitution If a tensed fact f constitutes reality, then f is real.
Obtainment If a tensed fact f obtains within a fragment F , then f exists relative to F .16
Generally speaking, taking two notions to be equally fundamental does not prevent one
from treating them as interdefinable. For instance, one can treat necessity and possibility as
interdefinable (in the presence of negation) without being forced to maintain that, from a
metaphysical point of view, one of the two notions is more fundamental that the other. Anal-
ogously, the fragmentalistmightwant to define, for the sake of theoretical simplicity, constitu-
tion as obtainment within some fragment or obtainment as constitution in a given fragment,
without contradicting the assumption that the two notions are equally fundamental.17
16The fact that the notion of being real and the notion of existence relative to a fragment are taken to be two
conceptually necessary conditions, respectively, of constitution and obtainment does not force the fragmentalist
to say that they are also part of an analysis of the notion of constitution and of the notion of obtainment. In
other words, it is compatible with the idea that constitution and obtainment are two fundamental notions. For
a defence of an analogous line of though, applied to the relation between knowledge and belief, see Williamson
(2000a: 43-44).
17I wish to thank another anonymous referee for raising this point.
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Now, suppose that Tim is sitting and then standing. The fragmentalist will describe such
a case by resorting to two different fragments, one inwhich the fact thatTim is sitting obtains,
and another one in which the fact that Tim is standing obtains. The fact that Tim is sitting
and the fact that Tim is standing constitute reality in an absolute sense, and so absolutely
speaking they are equally real. But there is no fragment in which they obtain together, and so
there is no fragment relative to which they both exist. This means that the contradictory fact
thatTim is sitting and standing cannot obtain. Nor can it constitute reality. If a tensed fact is
real, then there must be at least one fragment relative to which the fact exists. Otherwise, we
would end upwith ametaphysics where the fact—say—thatTim is sitting exists relative to no
fragment but nonetheless is real: an unpalatable scenario, for it is hard to see howTim can be
sitting if there is no moment of time where he is so. It follows that the contradictory fact that
Tim is sitting and standing cannot be real, since there is no fragment relative to which it can
exist. This is a crucial aspect of the fragmentalist picture: the rejection of Coherence should
not be understood as an invitation to accept contradictory facts (Fine 2005: 282). Given that
reality cannot contain the contradictory fact thatTim is sitting and standing, there is no fact on
which the truth of a contradictory claim like ‘Tim is both sitting and standing’ can supervene.
This means that from a semantic point of view, the truth of two claims might not be enough
to conclude that their conjunction is true as well.
To sumup,while the standard tense realist is allowed to treat constitution andobtainment
as interchangeable notions, the fragmentalist adopts amore refined stance. For surewithin the
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fragmentalist framework the relationship between the two notions is still close. As I repeat,
if a tensed fact obtains, then it also constitutes reality. And if it constitutes reality, then there
must be at least one fragment where it obtains. But since obtainment is never thought of as
obtainment simpliciter (but rather as limited to a given fragment), constitution is not enough
to guarantee the obtainment of a tensed fact in every fragment.
One might object that the idea that facts are absolutely real contradicts the claim that
their existence is to be relativised to moments of time. My answer is that the interpretation of
fragmentalism I’m proposing here should be understood as a form ofmetaphysical pluralism,
that is, as a theory according to which there are two equally fundamental ways to describe
reality. When it comes to tell what facts constitute reality, the fragmentalist focuses on the
first of the two ways. When it comes to tell what facts obtain, instead, she focuses on the
second one. This squares nicely with Fine’s idea that within a fragmentalist framework, “in
stating that a fact belongs to reality, we adopt a general perspective, but in stating that a fact
obtains, we adopt the current perspective” (Fine 2005: 297, italicsmine). The fragmentalistwill
think of these perspectives—so to say—as carving at the joints, asmarking twometaphysically
fundamental features of the temporal dimension: the absolute constitution of tensed facts
and their limited obtainment. From the general perspective—the perspective centred on the
temporal dimension as a whole—the fragmentalist will assess what facts constitute reality.
From the current perspective—the perspective centred on a given fragment—she will assess
what facts obtain. Of course, these perspectives offer two profoundly different descriptions
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of reality, so different that one might suspect that the perspective-talk is at risk of collapsing
into a contradictory talk. But it should be clear that the fragmentalist can never adopt the
two perspectives at the same time: either she focuses on the notion of constitution or she
focuses on the notion of obtainment, tertium non datur. Thus, there is no way to end up
with a description of reality where, at the same time, Tim’s being sitting exists and does not
exist. All she can say is that, from the current perspective, the fact that Tim is sitting can
lack existence depending on the fragment we adopt, whereas from the general perspective it
constitutes reality absolutely speaking.
Although Fine’s theory rises in the context of the metaphysics of time, the fragmentalist
approach canbe extended to the treatment ofmodality. An extension of the view to themodal
case has been briefly mentioned by Fine. However, the idea is not discussed in detail. As he
underlines, both in the temporal case and in the modal one “we have. . . a certain aspectual
feature. . . [—respectively, the tensed nature of facts and their beingworldly (or contingent)—
] and an associated form of relativity” (2005: 284-285)—the relativity being, respectively, to a
time and to a world. By exploiting the analogy between times and worlds, we can reinterpret
Realism, Absolutism, and Neutrality as follows (p. 285; Coherence will be left untouched):18
Worldly Realism Reality is composed of worldly facts.
Worldly Absolutism The constitution of reality is an absolutematter, i.e. not relative to aworld.
Worldly Neutrality No possible world is privileged, i.e. the facts that constitute reality are not
18See also Fine (2006: 400).
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oriented towards one possible world as opposed to another.
We can now give the modal analogue of the standard tense realism vs. non-standard tense
realism debate. As Fine (2005: 285) has it:
The standard realist will claim that there is a privileged world, namely the actual world,
while the non-standard realist will treat all worlds on an ontological par (but still hold to
the reality of worldly facts).
CallModal Fragmentalism the non-standard realist view that rejects Coherence, while main-
taining both Worldly Absolutism and Worldly Neutrality. The metaphysical picture is that
themodal dimension is not “of a whole”, but rather it is fragmented intomaximally coherent
collections of worldly facts—call them modal fragments. All the modal fragments are onto-
logically on a par. Given that here modal fragments are defined as collections of worldly facts
and thatmany (if not all) of these facts have concrete entities as constituents, the fragmentalist
will take each modal fragment to be as concrete as the one we inhabit. Modal Fragmentalism
might prima facie recall Lewis’s (1986) concretism. In fact, the two theories bear similarities, if
only because both possible worlds andmodal fragments are treated as concrete entities. How-
ever, there are (at least) two crucial differences.
4 Constitution and obtainment in the modal case
The first difference is that, just as the fragmentalist distinguishes between obtainment and
constitution in describing time, the modal fragmentalist adopts an analogous distinction in
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describing the modal dimension. She links the notion of constitution to the notion of being
real, while treating obtainment as linked to the notion of existence relative to a modal frag-
ment. Thus, she endorses the following modal versions of Constitution and Obtainment:
Modal constitution If a worldly fact f constitutes reality, then f is real.
Modal obtainment If a worldly fact f obtains within amodal fragmentF , then f exists relative toF .
Although both the modal fragmentalist and the Lewisian concretist think of constitution as
an absolutematter, for the latter facts obtain simpliciter, while for the former they obtain only
within a given modal fragment. Facts that obtain within modal fragments different from the
one we inhabit constitute reality in the same sense as facts that obtain in ourmodal fragment,
that is, absolutely. However,within eachmodal fragmentnot all such facts obtain. Thismeans
that not all facts that constitute reality obtain in all the modal fragments. The Lewisian con-
cretist, on the contrary, has no reason whatsoever to deny that if a fact constitutes reality then
it also obtains simpliciter. To be clear about this point, consider the following version of the
principle (P):
(P*) A fact f obtains if and only if f constitutes reality.
For the Lewisian concretist, the left-to-right reading of (P*) is a metaphysical triviality: how
can a fact obtainwithout ipso facto constituting reality? Also themodal fragmentalist is happy
to accept the idea that constitution is a necessary condition for obtainment, provided that we
read ‘obtains’ as ‘obtains within a given fragment’. According to the Lewisian concretist, the
right-to-left reading of (P*) is fine as well: if a fact constitutes reality, then it also obtains.
Consider for instance the fact that there are talking donkeys. Of course, the latter are not spa-
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tiotemporally related to theworldwe inhabit.19 But being spatiotemporally related to aworld
and being the constituent of an obtaining fact are two notions that should not be conflated,
not even in theLewisian framework. Even though talking donkeys are not part of themaximal
connected object that we call our world, nothing prevents facts about their being spatiotem-
porally related to another world from obtaining in our world. To put it another way, the fact
that talking donkeys are spatiotemporally unrelated to us should not be equated with the fact
that they do not exist. All the Lewisian concretist can say is simply that, as a matter of fact,
they are not part of our world, and not that they are not part of reality altogether.
In contrast to the Lewisian concretist, the modal fragmentalist will claim that when it
comes to tell what facts obtain, it is correct to say that there is no non-actual entity “out there”.
There is no possible object located in a different modal region, since no worldly fact about its
existence can obtain within our modal fragment. This is so because when it comes to focus
on the facts that obtain (and not on the facts that constitute reality), she takes facts about the
existence of a given object as irreducibly relative to themodal fragment it belongs to. Just as in
the temporal case, the modal fragmentalist can adopt a form of “perspective”-talk. In stating
that there are no possibilia, she adopts the current perspective—the perspective centred on
themodal fragment we inhabit. This is the sense in which the quantifier ‘there is’ is employed
in the above sentence ‘there is no possible object located in a different modal region’. In stat-
ing that the objects located in all the other modal fragments constitute reality in an absolute
19More details on the role that spatiotemporal relations play in Lewis’s conception of possible worlds can be
found inMenzel (2017, § 2.1).
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manner, instead, she adopts the general perspective—the perspective centred on the modal
dimension.20 For this reason, also the modal version of fragmentalism can be regarded as a
pluralist metaphysics. From the general perspective, worldly facts about talking donkeys con-
stitute reality in an absolute manner, and yet no fact about talking donkeys can obtain from
the current perspective. For the same reasons discussed in the temporal case, although the de-
scriptions of reality enabled by the two perspectives are profoundly different, there is no way
to get a contradictory description of what there is: the two perspectives are never adopted at
the same time.
Not only is it the case that the description of reality cannot be incoherent, it is also the
case that reality itself does not contain contradictory facts, like the fact that there are and there
are not talking donkeys. Themodal dimension contains bothmodal fragments where the fact
that there are talking donkeys obtain and modal fragments where the fact that there are no
talking donkeys obtain.21 Since a fact obtains only if it constitutes reality, it follows that both
the fact that there are talking donkeys and the fact that there are not talking donkeys costitute
reality. And given Worldly Absolutism, they do so absolutely speaking. This is the sense in
which Modal Fragmentalism rejects Coherence. But notice that there is no modal fragment
able to host the fact that there are and there are not talking donkeys (each modal fragment is
20A somehow similar distinction between the perspective centred on a world and the perspective centred on
the modal dimension can be found in Solomyak (2013: 33-40).
21The expression ‘the fact that there are no talking donkeys’ should not be read as suggesting an ontological
commitment toward negative facts.
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internally coherent). Given that no fact can constitute realitywithout obtaining in at least one
modal fragment, the fact that there are and there are not talking donkeys does not constitute
reality. I will return on this point in section 5.
As anticipated in section 1, this first difference between the modal fragmentalist and the
Lewisian concretist is particularly interesting in that it shows that the adoption of possibilia is
not tantamount, per se, to completely rejecting the actualist intuition that if an object is not
actual, then it lacks existence. The modal fragmentalist can at least partially vindicate it by
insisting thatwithin each fragment an actualist ontology holds. For the reasons just described,
within her pluralist metaphysics the assumption thatmodal fragments constitute reality in an
absolute manner does not conflict with the idea that, from the current perspective, everything
there is is actual. In section 1 I pointed out that actualism can be regarded as composed by the
following two theses: (I) the quantifier ‘there is’ is existentially loaded and (II) no non-actual
objects exist. In the same spirit, Modal Fragmentalismmaintains that, when the perspective is
centred on the modal fragment we inhabit, the thesis that everything there is is actual should
be understood as the claim that everything which exists is actual. Given a modal fragment F ,
although from the general perspective the objects belonging to all the other modal fragments
constitute reality in an absolute sense, from the current perspective they simply do not exist in
F , since facts about their existence cannot obtain. It follows that from the current perspective
it does notmake sense to claim that there are non-actual objects: if an object is not actual, then
it does not exist.
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Thus, the fragmentalist approach can partially vindicate actualism in a way that is simply
unavailable to the Lewisian concretist. The latter works under the hypothesis that all facts
obtain simpliciter and hence within every world; no distinction between being absolutely real
and existing relative to a world is needed. Within her framework no fundamental current
perspective can be employed to argue that, in a metaphysically robust sense, objects that are
non-actual literally lack existence. The modal fragmentalist, on the contrary, opts for the idea
that not every fact constituting reality obtains in every modal fragment. It is the notion of
relative existence, whichModal Fragmentalism links to the notion of obtainment, that allows
the fragmentalist to offer a way to account for reality profoundly different from but no less
fundamental than the way offered by the adoption of the general perspective. Even if facts
about talking donkeys are absolutely real when assessed from the general perspective, from
the current one they literally lack existence relative to our modal fragment. I will return on
this point in section 6, where I will discuss how Modal Fragmentalism behaves with respect
to SQML.
One might wonder whether the fragmentalist perspective-talk is nothing but a variant of
Lewis’s double talk between what there is and what is actual (in the merely indexical sense
of the term). I grant that there is a certain resemblance between the two things. As a matter
of fact, the objects that are actual from the current perspective are the same as the objects
that Lewis takes to be actual in the indexical sense. But it should now be clear that there is an
important difference. For theLewisian concretist, saying that an object is (indexically) actual is
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tantamount to saying that the object is one of our worldmates, viz., that it is spatiotemporally
related tous. For themodal fragmentalist, instead, saying that anobject is actual is tantamount
to saying that facts about its existence obtain within ourmodal fragment. As I stressed above,
spatiotemporal relatedness and obtainment are notions that the Lewisian concretist should
keepdistinct. Of course, there is a sense inwhich, bywayofquantifier restriction, theLewisian
concretist can account for ordinary claims like: ‘Talking donkeys do not exist’. But when it
comes to offer a metaphysically perspicuous reading of these claims, the Lewisian concretist
and the modal fragmentalist take separate paths. From the current perspective, the modal
fragmentalist reads the claim as literally true: talking donkeys are not part of reality; neither
they are spatiotemporally related to us nor they exist relative to our modal fragment. The
Lewisian concretist, instead, will offer a rephrasing of this type: ‘Talking donkeys are not part
of our world’, fromwhich one is not allowed to infer that talking donkeys lack existence. The
only way the modal fragmentalist can offer a similar rephrasing is by equipping herself with
a restricted notion of constitution which mimics that of indexical actuality by ranging only
over facts that constitute reality locally, that is, by being part of ourmodal fragment. From this
restricted general perspective, as we can call it, the claim ‘Talking donkeys do not exist’ can be
finally read as ‘Talking donkeys are not the constituents of facts that constitute reality locally’,
fromwhich, in a Lewisian fashion, it does not follow that reality contains no facts at all about
talking donkeys. The perspective-talk is introduced tomake sense of the pluralist assumption
that obtainment and constitution are two distinct and equally fundamental notions, while
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nothing similar can be said about the canonical double talk between what there is and what
is (indexically) actual.
5 Counterpart theory and transworld identity
Letusnowpresent a second crucial differencebetween themodal fragmentalist and theLewisian
concretist. Notoriously, Lewis’s concretism is bound to adopt the so-called counterpart the-
ory (1986, Ch. 4). The latter posits that objects are world-bound: their existence is limited to
the world of which they are part.22 World-boundedness is required to maintain both the idea
that objects have properties in an absolute manner (i.e. not relative to a world) and the idea
that reality does not contain contradictory facts, for example the fact thatAlice is and is not a
philosopher. Suppose that Alice is a philosopher in our world. Under the reasonable hypoth-
esis that Alice does not essentially have the property of being a philosopher, there is at least
one worldw in which a counterpart of Alice is not a philosopher. Why doesn’t the Lewisian
concretist claim that it is Alice herself that is not a philosopher inw? It is tempting to say that
Alice has the property of being a philosopher relative to our world, while she lacks the prop-
erty relative tow. But the Lewisian concretist cannot opt for thismove, for shemaintains that
the fact thatAlice is a philosopher constitutes reality in an absolute manner, not relative to a
given world. Thus, she resorts to Alice’s counterparts in order to avoid the unwelcome con-
clusion that Alice—absolutely speaking—both has and does not have the property of being a
22This does not mean that their existence is relative to worlds.
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philosopher. She will say that whilst Alice is a philosopher, one of her counterparts is not.
In contrast to the Lewisian concretist, the modal fragmentalist drops Coherence; this
means that she admits that both the fact that Alice is a philosopher and the fact that Alice
is not a philosopher can constitute reality.23 Since the two facts are part of two different modal
fragments and they share Alice as their constituent, the modal fragmentalist will think of Al-
ice as located in more than one modal fragment. Given Worldly Absolutism, the two facts
constitute reality in an absolute sense. It is thus natural to assume, in line with the Lewisian
concretist, that Alice bears properties in an absolute manner. But, in contrast to what would
happen in the Lewisian framework, this is not enough to conclude that reality contains the
fact that Alice is and is not a philosopher. Since the modal fragmentalist takes obtainment
to be always limited to a given modal fragment, in allowing Alice to inhabit more than one
modal fragment she is not forced to say that the fact that Alice is a philosopher and the fact
thatAlice is not a philosopher obtain together. From the current perspective, no fact likeAlice
is and is not a philosopher can be found. And given that, as seen above, a fact can constitute
reality only if there is at least one modal fragment where it obtains, nor is she forced to admit
that the fact can ultimately be found at the level of the general perspective. If a fact is real,
then there must be a modal fragment relative to which the fact exists. Otherwise, in analogy
to the temporal case, we would be forced to say that a worldly fact can be real even if it exists
relative to no modal fragment. If Alice is a philosopher at all, she surely is so in at least one
23Once again, please do not read expressions like ‘the fact that Alice is not a philosopher’ as suggesting an
ontological commitment toward negative facts.
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modal fragment. Thus, if the fact thatAlice is and is not a philosopher were real, there should
be a modal fragment relative to which it exists. But that cannot be the case, since all modal
fragments are taken to be internally coherent.
Letmeunderline, once again, that here I’mnot arguing for a theory that favours transworld
identity to the disadvantage of the idea that reality does not contain incompatible contents.
The idea that objects can be literally present at more than one possible world is an extremely
complex topic, and it is still an open question whether it should be preferred to counterpart
theory. Rather, my point is that the fragmentalist view is remarkable in that it shows, sur-
prisingly enough, that the idea that objects have properties in an absolute sense does not nec-
essarily require counterpart theory. At least in principle, one might maintain that there can
be transworld identity between objects that bear properties in an absolute manner without
being forced to admit contradictory facts, like the fact thatAlice is and is not a philosopher.
There is another important lesson one can draw from the fragmentalist adoption of trans-
world identity. From a semantic point of view, Lewis’s counterpart theory is incompatible
with the idea that proper names are rigid designators,24 that is, with the Kripkean (1980) tenet
that an expression like ‘Alice’ picks out the same individual in all the possible worlds where
Alice exists. According to Lewis (1986: 256) an expression like ‘Alice’ is at most a “quasi-rigid
designator”, in the sense that in any possible world containing a counterpart of Alice, the
expression designates a counterpart of Alice, not Alice herself. It is then interesting to note
24See Sullivan (2005) for a thorough discussion of this point.
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that one can maintain that objects have properties in an absolute manner without opting for
the quasi-rigidity of proper names. By dropping world-boundedness in favour of transworld
identity, the modal fragmentalist has the resources to preserve Kripke (1980)’s semantic intu-
itions. Alice is literally located inmore than onemodal fragment, so the fact that ‘Alice’ proves
to be rigid is nothing but a welcome conclusion.
6 Modal Fragmentalism and SQML
Further differences and analogies betweenModal Fragmentalism and the other positions pre-
sented in this paper can be highlighted by discussing how the former reacts to the adoption of
SQML.25 As we saw in section 4, from the current perspective there is no non-actual object.
Thismeans that from the current perspective there is no entity able to provide a supervenience
base for the truth of BF, NE, and BC. The fact that the latter do not hold from any current
perspective is an important feature of Modal Fragmentalism, a feature that allows it to meet
the desideratum of partially vindicating actualism. To put it differently, the fact that from
the current perspective the modal fragmentalist lacks the metaphysical resources to account
for their truth is exactly what we should expect from a theory able to vindicate, at least in
part, the tenet at the root of actualism: from the current perspective, everything which exists
is actual. Thus, unless one inflates the inventory of each modal fragment—in the same spirit
25In what follows I will assume that, from a logical point of view, our fragmentalist models fragments in
much the way that possible worlds are usually modelled in possible worlds semantics. For a formal presentation
of SQML see n. 3.
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as non-standard actualism—with surrogates for possibilia, from the current perspective the
modal fragmentalist is simply unable to offer an adequate treatment of BF, NE, and BC.
There is, however, a way to account for the truth of these formulae. Remember that the
modal fragmentalist can exploit the metaphysical resources offered by her pluralist view. The
current perspective is only part of the overallmetaphysical picture. In evaluatingmodal claims
from the general perspective, she can follow the ontic possibilist (see above, p. 6) in treating
modal operators as ranging over possible objects. In other words, in evaluating modal claims
from the general perspective, modal operators can be treated as unrestricted quantifiers over
possible worlds, in the same way as they are treated by the Lewisian concretist when she does
metaphysics.26 From the general perspective, it is perfectly coherent to claim that the truth of
BF,NE, andBC supervenes on the facts that constitute reality. The idea that, from thepremise
that it is possible that I have a sister, it follows by BF that there is an object that possibly is my
sister is a welcome conclusion, for reality is indeed constituted—in an absolute manner—by
at least one modal fragment containing that object. NE will not be problematic either: in
so far as our fragmentalist adopts the general perspective, NE can be read as stating that every
object necessarily exists. Analogously, in accounting for the truth of BC our fragmentalist will
accept that, from the general perspective, objects can have properties even inmodal fragments
where they are mere possible things. Sure, in contrast to the Lewisian concretist, at the level
of the obtainment our fragmentalist is bound to deny the existence of such things. Still, from
26Cf. Williamson (2013: 16).
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the general perspective they do function as a supervenience base for the truth of BC, and this
is the reason why the modal fragmentalist is ultimately able to make sense of its adoption.
I would like to underline that a similar strategy can be employed to deal with the case of
Alice, discussed in section 5. Exploiting the metaphysical resources offered by the general per-
spective, the modal fragmentalist can argue that the truth of a claim such as: ‘Alice could have
lacked the property of being a philosopher’ supervenes on the fact thatAlice is a philosopher,
which is part of the modal fragment we inhabit, and the fact thatAlice is not a philosopher,
which is part of at least one modal fragment different from ours.
It is important to underline that, in line with the pluralist assumption that there are two
equally fundamental ways to describe reality, BF, NE, and BC are evaluated as true or false
either from the current perspective or from the general one. There is no way to evaluate them
independently of any perspective. Nor can they be evaluated frommore than one perspective
at a time. BF, NE, and BC are false from the current perspective and true from the general
one. This, however, does not force the modal fragmentalist to conclude that there are true
contradictions, since there is no perspective from which BF, NE, and BC can be evaluated as
both true and false.
7 Conclusion
A more fine-grained taxonomy of the possibilist approaches is now available, based on how
one reacts toThesis I (the quantifier ‘there is’ should be read as existentially loaded) andThesis
II (there are no non-actual objects). A first option is to reject both of them. A second option,
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that leads to what we called ontic possibilism, is to reject Thesis II by introducing possible ob-
jects, while keeping Thesis I. A third option—the pluralist approach that we labeled Modal
Fragmentalism—is to adopt both Thesis I and Thesis II from the current perspective, while
maintaining thatThesis II is false from the general perspective. Amore fine-grained taxonomy
of concretism is now available as well, based on whether one is willing to uphold transworld
identity while maintaining that objects have properties in an absolute manner. The Lewisian
concretist rejects transworld identity in favour of counterpart theory, while the modal frag-
mentalist has the metaphysical resources to keep it.
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